Extensive-form game

Results: 193



#Item
161Nash equilibrium / Science / Correlated equilibrium / Strategy / Extensive-form game / Solution concept / Epsilon-equilibrium / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

A Sampling-Based Approach to Computing Equilibria in Succinct Extensive-Form Games Miroslav Dud´ık, Geoffrey J. Gordon Carnegie Mellon University Machine Learning Department

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Source URL: www.cs.cmu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-05-28 16:39:13
162Shapley value / Bargaining / Cooperative game / Core / Extensive-form game / Nash equilibrium / Transferable utility / Zero–sum game / Utility / Game theory / Problem solving / Decision theory

61c 1 On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth–Shafer Examples

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Source URL: www.ma.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2005-03-30 14:30:13
163Science / Solution concept / Outcome / Normal-form game / Strategy / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

RASMUSSEN: “chap-01” — [removed] — 19:22 — page 9 — #1 RASMUSSEN: “chap-01” — [removed] — 19:22 — page 10 — #2 1.1

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Source URL: www.rasmusen.org

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:35
164Sequential equilibrium / Bayesian game / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Subgame / Nash equilibrium / The Intuitive Criterion / Signaling game / Strategy / Extensive-form game / Game theory / Problem solving / Solution concept

6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III Asymmetric information, and, in particular, incomplete information, is enormously important in game theory. This is particularly true for dynamic games, sin

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Source URL: www.rasmusen.org

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:35
165Extensive-form game / Science / Information set / Solution concept / Normal-form game / Nash equilibrium / Complete information / Game tree / Outcome / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

2.1 The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game If half of strategic thinking is predicting what the other player will do, the other half is figuring out what he knows. Most of the games in chapter 1 assumed that the mo

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Source URL: www.rasmusen.org

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:35
166Subgame / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Non-credible threat / Nash equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Information set / Strategy / Best response / Outcome / Game theory / Problem solving / Solution concept

4.1 Subgame Perfectness In this chapter we will make heavy use of the extensive form to study games with moves that occur in sequence. We start in section 4.1 with a refinement of the Nash equilibrium

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Source URL: www.rasmusen.org

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:35
167Information / Economics / The Market for Lemons / Information asymmetry / Extensive-form game / Nash equilibrium / Adverse selection / Futures contract / Agent / Asymmetric information / Game theory / Market failure

9.1 Introduction: Production Game VI In chapter 7, games of asymmetric information were divided between games with moral hazard, in which agents are identical, and games with adverse selection, in which agents

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Source URL: www.rasmusen.org

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:35
168Science / Nash equilibrium / Solution concept / Subgame / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Non-credible threat / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Stable model semantics / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Decisions, Agents and Games Marina De Vos* and Dirk Vermeir Dept. of Computer Science Free University of Brussels, VUB Pleinlaan 2, Brussels 1050, Belgium Tel: +[removed]

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Source URL: www.tark.org

Language: English - Date: 2011-10-23 10:31:50
169Graphical models / Bayesian statistics / Statistical models / Probability theory / Networks / Bayesian network / Random variable / Influence diagram / Extensive-form game / Statistics / Mathematics / Probability and statistics

Structured models for multi-agent interactions* Daphne Koller Brian Milch Computer Science Department Stanford University Stanford, CA[removed]

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Source URL: www.tark.org

Language: English - Date: 2011-10-23 10:31:50
170Decision theory / Extensive-form game / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Minimax / Learning / Strategy / Reinforcement learning / Game theory / Problem solving / Science

L E A R N I N G TO P L A Y G A M E S IN E X T E N S I V E F O R M BY VALUATION PHILIPPE JEHIEL AND DOV SAMET Extended abstract

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Source URL: www.tark.org

Language: English - Date: 2011-10-23 10:31:50
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